Courts - Extraordinary Writs - Quo Warranto in North Dakota by Bjertness, Donald E
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 33 Number 1 Article 5 
1957 
Courts - Extraordinary Writs - Quo Warranto in North Dakota 
Donald E. Bjertness 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bjertness, Donald E. (1957) "Courts - Extraordinary Writs - Quo Warranto in North Dakota," North Dakota 
Law Review: Vol. 33 : No. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol33/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
[VoL. 33
NOTES
COURTS - EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - Quo WARRANTO IN NORTH
DAKOTA.- The writ of quo warranto is of ancient origin and had
its beginning as a prerogative writ issued by the king.' It was first
devised as a common law civil remedy and was later modified to
become criminal in character, i.e., the information in the nature of
quo warranto. Regardless of this nature it is treated as a civil
action," since in most instances the two, writ of quo warranto and
the information in the nature of quo warranto, are used synony-
mouslyA
The definition of this writ given by Spelling in his treatise on
extraordinary remedies is, "Quo warranto, or information in the
nature of quo warranto, is the remedy or proceeding whereby the
state inquires into the legality of the claim which a party asserts to
an office or franchise, and to oust him from its enjoyment if the
claim be not well founded, or to have the same declared forfeited,
and recover it, if, having once been rightfully possessed and en-
joyed, it has become forfeited for mis-user or non-user."4 The
North Dakota Code provides, "The remedies formerly attainable by
the writ of scire facias, the writ of quo warranto, and proceedings
by information in the nature of quo warranto may be obtained by
civil action in district court . . ."5 Original jurisdiction to issue
writs of quo warranto is vested by the North Dakota Constitution
both in the supreme court' and in the district courts.' The Code
provisions for the civil action instead of the writ, as set out above,
have remained substantially the same in their language since terri-
torial days., The fact that this section did not abolish the con-
stitutional grant of jurisdiction to issue such writs was brought out
in the case of State ex rel. Sathre v. Roberts" where the court said:
" There is no merit in the defendant's contention that the
writ of quo warranto is abolished by section 531 of the Code
of Civil Procedure of 1877, section 7969, Compiled Laws
1913... If this section, which became law in 1877, abolished
the writ of quo warranto and proceedings by information in
1. See 2 Bailey, Habeas Corpus 1245 (1913).
2. Id. at 1246-1249.
3. State ex rel. Smith v. Anderson, 8 So. 1, 3 (Fla. 1890) (dictum).
4. 2 Spelling, Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies, 1516 (1901).
5. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-1301 (1943).
6. N. D. Const., Art. 87.
7. N. D. Const., Art. 103.
8. Comp. Laws N. D. 0 7969 (1913); N. D. Rev. Code I 7349 (1905); N. D. Rev.
Code § 5741 (1895); Dakota Codes, Code of Civ. Proc., § 531 (Levisee 1883).
9. 67 N. D. 92, 269 N.W. 913 (1936); See Wright v. Lee, 4 S. D. 237, 55 N.W. 931
(1893) (Construing a like provision in South Dakota Code).
the nature of quo warranto, as appellant contends, then the
power to issue the writ was duly restored by Section 87 of the
Constitution adopted in 1889 .. .but section 7969 does not
repeal or abolish the writ of quo warranto. It simply provides
that the remedies formerly attainable by such writ or informa-
tion may be obtained by a civil action."
A reading of the present and past statutory enactments providing
for a civil action in place of the writ, together with a reading of the
cases which have said that the statutes did not abolish the writ as it
existed at common law, would lead one to believe that a party has
two avenues of approach. The first is by way of petition for the
issuance of a writ of quo warranto, invoking the original jurisdic-
tion of the district court or the supreme court; the second is by way
ef instituting a civil action in district court.
The qualification in invoking the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, is that the matter must be consistent with the posi-
tion and dignity of that body. Before the Supreme Court of North
Dakota will recognize a petition for the writ in the first instance
the question must be publici juris affecting the sovereignty of the
state, its franchise prerogative, or the liberties of the people.'" This
is not only true of quo warranto but of all the other prerogative
writs issuing from that court.1"
TRYING TITLE TO OFFICE
Quo warranto is the proper proceeding to try the right or title
to public office,12 although North Dakota cases hold that in situ-
ations where there is a clear showing that one has a prima facie
right to the office he may petition for a writ of mandamus.- In
order for quo warranto to be applicable there must be an actual
usurpation of the public office, and mere intent or attempt to do is
not adequate.1
4
Another important factor is the status of the office in dispute, that
is, whether or not it is classified as a public office. In State ex rel.
10. See State v. Nelson County, 1 N. D. 88, 45 N.W. 33, 38 (1890) (dictum).
11. State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N. D. 359, 66 N.W. 234, 239, 240 (1896)
tdictum).
12. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Meyers, 74 N. D. 678,. 19 N.W.2d 745 (1945);
Morrow v. City of Cleveland, 73 Ohio App. 460, 56 N.E.2d 333 (1943).
13. State ex rel. Langer v. McDonald, 41 N. D. 389, 170 N.W. 873 (1919); State
ex rel. Butler v. Callahan, 4 N. D. 481, 61 N.W. 1025 (1895) (In this case the realtor,
county superintendent of schools-elect, had been elected to that position, had qualified 'or
office by taking oath and giving required bond, thereby giving him a clear right to the
office while the defendant was the defeated incumbent).
14. Romine v. Black, 304 Ill. App. 1, 25 N.E.2d 404, 406 (1940) (dictum) (Here
the action was brought in equity, defendant contended the proper proceeding was by writ of
quo warranto. But the court said that the defendant had not exercised any control over
the land in question when the bill was filed therefore quo warranto would not be proper);
State ex re!. Johnson v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 143 Neb. 753, 10 N.W.2d 784,
793 (1943) (dictum).
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McArthur v. McLean,15 "public office" was defined as "a public
position to which a portion of the sovereignty of the country,
either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches for the time being,
and which is exercised for the benefit of the public."
Cases in North Dakota illustrative of the use of quo warranto
and the civil action provided in the code to try right or title to
public office, have involved positions such as aldermen on a city
council," sheriff,'" county superintendent of schools," county
judge,' state highway commissioner,20 manager of the State Hail
Insurance Department, -2 1 and governor of the state.
22
15. 35 N. D. 203, 159 N.W. 847 (1916).
16. See State ex rel. Sathre v. Quickstad, 66 N. D. 689, 268 N.W. 683 (1936) (A
proceeding in quo warranto to test the right to hold this office. Defendants were in
arrears in payment of real and/or personal property taxes. The court found them in-
eligible to hold office because statute provided that one must be a qualified elector and not
ir. arrears in any tax or other liability due the city. Court also held that in spite of the
statute making the city council the judge of election and qualification of its own mem-
bers, this did not divest courts of jurisdiction in quo warranto).
17. See Holtan v. Beck, 20 N. D. 5, 125 N.W. 1048 (1910) (This was a civil action
for purpose of trying under writ of quo warranto, the opposing claims of the parties to the
office of sheriff. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed and dismissed on the ground
that he failed by competent evidence to prove the allegations necessary to sustain the
action ).
18. See Jenness v. Clark, 21 N. D. 150, 129 N.W. 357 (1910) (Civil action to try
title to this office. The plaintiff had held the office but had not run for re-election. The
defendant had been elected but was ineligible. Statute provided that the incumbent was
t., hold office until his successor qualifies. The plaintiff had turned the office over to the
defendant before this action was brought, upon demand by the district court. The court
held the plaintiff had sufficient interest as the incumbent to maintain the action, and that
she had not voluntarily given up the office).
19. S~e State ex rel. Sathre v. Roberts, 67 N. D. 92, 269 N.W. 913 (1936) (Barry was
elected county judge and served until he was found to be insane by commissioners of the
county and was committed to the state hospital. Roberts was appointed to the position.
Quo warranto was brought to try Roberts' right to the office. The court held for Barry on
the ground that the finding of insanity was not a judicial determination and therefore the
office had not been made vacant and Roberts was usurping the office held by Barry);
Wishek v. Becker, 10 N. D. 63, 84 N.W. 590 (1900) (Action to remove defendant from
office as county judge. Plaintiff's allegations charged malfeasance, while in office. Plaintiff
was not seeking title to the office but his sole purpose was to remove defendant. The
crurt held that in order to maintain the action he must have a special interest; that the
defendant was lawfully in office and there were proper remedies to remove persons from
office for just cause).
20. See State ex rel. Salisbury v. Vogel, 65 N. D. 137, 256 N.W. 404 (1943) (Appli-
cation for writ of quo warranto directed to the state highway commissioner to show why
hc continued to hold office. He had been convicted of a felony. The court held quo
warranto to be proper, it involved a public office and a conviction of a felony made the
defendant ineligible to hold the office and it had become vacant. The state on relation of
the new appointee may oust the intruder from office).
21. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Meyers, 74 N. D. 678, 19 N.W.2d 745 (1945) (In-
formation in nature of quo warranto, to defendant to show by what warrant he holds
the office in question. The basis for the information was that he had been removed from
office by the acting Commissioner of Insurance, then was re-appointed by the regular
Commissioner but the governor refused to approve the appointment which approval was re-
quired by statute. He exercised authority in the office without such approval. The court
held the case was proper for original jurisdiction of the supreme court and the require-
ment of approval by the governor was constitutional and that defendant was a usurper).
22. See State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N. D. 68, 256 N.W. 377 (1934) (Applica-
tion for writ of quo warranto on relation of the lieutenant governor requiring governor to
show cause why he continued to exercise the duties of that office. Defendant had been
convicted of a felony. The court held the conviction made him ineligible because he was
ni longer a qualified elector, therefore the office was vacant and the lieutenant governor
could challenge the defendant's right. The court also said this was not an intrusion upon
the legislature's power to impeach because the court merely determined that the defendant
was onqualified to hold the office).
APPLICABILITY OF THE WRIT TO MUNICIPAL AND
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
The remedy of quo warranto is the one properly invoked in
actions against municipal and public corporations23 for extending
their authority beyond the prescribed lawful limits.24 This does
not mean that merely exceeding its jurisdiction or authority will
suffice, for in that type of case the proper remedy is injunction. The
reason is that before quo warranto is applicable there must be an
actual intrusion upon another's authority or jurisdiction.2 5 In Red
Rwer Valley Brick Co. v. Grand Forks ,"2 an action was brought
to enjoin the City of Grand Forks from exercising any authority
or collecting taxes from territory that it had attempted to annex.
The defendant city contended that quo warranto was the proper
remedy. But the court ruled that quo warranto was not an ap-
propriate remedy because there was no usurpation of public office
or franchise, and that the officers of the city "are simply going
outside the territory over which they have jurisdiction, and per-
forming acts under color of law which are unofficial and void, if
not ratified.
'" 2 T
In contrast, the case of Weiderholt v. Lisbon Spec. School Dist.2t
concerned a situation where citizens and taxpayers residing in the
district involved brought an action to prevent the board of di-
iectors of the defendant school district from exercising jurisdic-
tion over the area annexed. The court held that the suit was cor-
rectly brought as a civil action for the remedy formerly attainable
by writ of quo warranto since it was a direct attack on the defend-
ant district's right to exercise authority over the territory in ques-
tion. The two cases can be distinguished on the ground that in the
former there was only an overextension of authority while in the
latter there was an actual usurpation.
In actions against municipal corporations the relief generally
granted is that of ouster of the intruder.29  Forfeiture of the
corporate franchise or charter is not given in these cases because to
do so would be against public policy, for it would leave that body
23. N. D. Rev. Code § 10-0103 (1943) "Corporations are either public or private.
Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the
state.
24. State ex rel. Walker v. McLean Cunty, 11 N. D. 356, 92 N.W. 385 (1902).
25. Red River Valley Brick Co. v. Grand Forks, 27 N. D. 8, 145 N.W. 725 (1914);
See also High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies 485, 486 (1884).
26. 27 N. D. 8, 145 N.W. 725 (1914).
27. Id. at 728.
28. 41 N. D. 146, 169 N.W. 809 (1918).
29. See City of South Miami v. State ex rel. Landis, 140 Fla. 740, 192 So. 624 (1939);
State v. City of Topeka, 30 Kan. 653, 2 Pac. 587 (1883).
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of people without a local government.3 0 Ouster on the other hand
wvill give adequate relief without the undesirable effects of for-
feiture.
APPLICABILITY OF THE WRIT TO PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS
hi North Dakota it is provided by statute that the civil action
may be brought when any office in a corporation created by the
authority of the state is usurped.: ' However, there appear to be no
cases in North Dakota involving a petition for writ of quo warranto,
or the civil action in its stead for the usurpation of an office in
private corporations or against private corporations for mis-user or
non-user of a corporate franchise.
The general rule in other jurisdictions is that the remedy of quo
warranto is available if there has been a usurpation of an office in
a private corporation. This is based on the theory that private cor-
porations are chartered by the state and are organized under the
statutes of the state and therefore are public franchises, so that an
intrusion on an office of such corporation is an abuse of the privi-
lege granted by the state. 2
PROPER PARTIES TO THE ACTION
As to the proper parties in this type of action the North Dakota
Code provides: "An action may be commenced by the state, or any
person who has a special interest in the action .. ."" In State ex
rel. Frish v. Nohle", the application for a writ of quo warranto was
denied on the basis of the lack of any special interest. The court
indicated that when it is shown that the relator has no more interest
than any other resident or taxpayer the writ will not be issued even
when indorsed by the attorney general. The matter of interest on
the part of the motivating party is important for it is the state and
not a private citizen who should champion the rights of the public
through the use of this writ. '
TRIAL BY JURY
Considering briefly the question of trial by jury in quo warranto
proceedings in North Dakota, the constitution provides that there
30. State ex rel. Cooper v. Ellis, 211 Ala. 489, 100 So. 866, 868 (1924) (dictum);
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 14 Pa. 177, 182 (1850) (dictum).
31. N. D. Rev. Code 1 32-1303 (1) (1943).
32. Brooks v. State, 26 Del. 1, 79 Att. 790, 796 (1911) (dictum); Komusymski v.
Popovich, 218 Mich. 481, 188 N.W. 386, 387 (1922) (dictum).
33. N. T). Rev. Code § 32-1303 (1943); See also Tallmadge v. Walker, 34 N. D.
590, 159 N.W. 71 (1916).
34. 16 N. D. 168, 112 N.W. 141 (1907).
35. State ex rel. Frish v. Nohle, 16 N. D. 168, 112 N.W. 141, 143 (1907) (dictum).
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shall be no trial by jury in the supreme court, but in cases that
present questions of fact, such questions may be sent to a district
court for trial. ' " This was done in the case of State ex rel. Sathre v.
Moodie, :1 but the district court, because of the extremely high pub-
lic feeling in the state at that time concerning the office of governor,
returned a certificate to the supreme court stating that it would be
impossible to obtain an impartial jury. Thesupreme court then
ruled on both the questions of fact and the questions of law after
both parties waived the jury trial. One year later in State ex rel.
Sathre v. Roberts:*' a demand in district court for a trial by jury was
refused, and the supreme court stated that the question was one of
law and that it was not error to refuse it. These cases indicate that
a right to a trial by jury is provided if questions of fact are in-
volved.
RIGHTS OF BOTH PARTIES TO THE ACTION
The judgment in a proceeding in quo warranto can be rendered
on the rights of both parties.:"' When rendered in favor of the one
alleged to be entitled to the office, such person will immediately
be able to act in that capacity." ' In Haaland v. Verendrye Electric
Cooperative,"  a judgment had been rendered in district court for
the plaintiff, annuling the newly passed by-laws'and declaring that
thle plaintiffs were directors of the cooperative. The defendants
made original application in the supreme court for an order staying
e),ecution of the judgment while they perfected their appeal. The
plaintiffs contended that the judgment in the district court was in
the nature of a judgment in quo warranto and as such was self-
executing. In ruling in favor of the application for the order stay-
ing the judgment, the supreme court stated that the provisions of
the code,4 2 which the plaintiffs alleged were applicable to the
judgment in the district court, applied only to public office and
36. See note 6 supra.
37. 65 N. D. 340, 258 N.W. 558, (1935).
38. 67 N. D. 92, 269 N.W. 913 (1936).
39. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-1306 (1943).
40. See N. D. Rev. Code § 32-1307 (1943).
41. 66 N.W.2d 902 (N. D. 1954).
42. N.D. Rev. Code §,32-1307 (1943) "If judgment is rendered upon the right of the
person alleged to be entitled to the office and the same is in favor of such person, he shall be
entitled, after taking the oath of office and executing such official bond as may be required
by law, to take upon himself the execution of the office, and it shall be his duty immedi-
ately thereafter to demand of the defendant in the action all the books and papers in his
custody or within his power, belonging to the office from which he shall have been ex-
cluded."; N. D. Rev. Code 0 32-1308 (1943) "If the defendant refuses or neglects to
deliver any of the books or papers demanded, as prescribed in section 32-1307, he is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and the court, or a judge thereof, by order, may put the person
entitled to the office in possession thereof and of all the books and papers belonging thereto,
and any party refusing to deliver the same, when ordered as aforesaid, shall be punished
as for a contempt."
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not to offices of private corporations. The court stated further, that
judgments rendered in civil actions in place of the writ of quo
warranto were not completely self-executing because the statute
provides that the usurper is not subject to contempt immediately
for failure to comply with the judgment, but only after a demand
had been made upon the usurper and after an order by the judge.
DONALD E. BJERTNESS.
ToRTs - RIGHT OF PRIVACY - APPLICATION AND SCOPE OF THE
RIGHT. - The right of privacy has been variously defined as the
'right to be let alone,"' to live a life of seclusion and to be free from
public scrutiny and comment,* to be protected from any wrongful
intrusion into one's private life which would outrage or cause
mental suffering, shame or humiliation,:' to be free from unauthor-
ized and unwarranted publicity, 4 and to live without one's name,
picture or statue being made public.5 The right of privacy grew
up as a defense against the modern techniques of transportation,
communication, and publication. It is the abuse of such techniques
which completely engulf an individual's personal life in the ab-
sence of legal remedy.6 As the techniques continue to improve, so
should the law progress.7 The development of the right of privacy
has had its difficulties because its need was not felt until after the
common law had become well settled. Many judges, trained to
rigidly apply the law as they found it, have in the past ignored the
underlying traditions of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and have re-
fused to recognize the right.' Even today a few judges maintain
that position, but they are a rapidly dwindling minority. 9
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
At common law the action for the invasion of privacy did not ex-
ist."9 Privacy, however, was protected in many instances, when it
could be associated with some other common law action such as
1. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
2. See Abenathy v. Thornton, 83 So.2d 235, (Ala. 1956).
3. See Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash.2d 267, 177 P.2d
896 (1956).
4. See Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
5. See Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 192 S. C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940).
6. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 196 (1890).
7. Comment, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 507, 520.
8. Nizer The Right of Privacy, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 525, 559 (1940-41).
9. Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Yoeckel v.
Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
10. See Elmhurst v. Shoreham Hotel, 58 F. Supp. 484 (D. C. Cir. 1945) (dictum).
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